From an international perspective, it is clear that treaties and executive agreements are perfect substitutes. In fact, international law does not recognize the term “executive agreement”. The term “treaty” is broader than in the domestic context of the United States. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states that any written agreement between states of international law is considered a “treaty” and therefore creates a binding legal obligation. Footnote 27 Since U.S. treaties and executive agreements meet this definition, there is no legal difference between these commitment appropriations from an international perspective. And while the U.S. is not a part of the VCLT, the State Department effectively enforces the VCLT definition and treats both contracts and executive agreements as equivalent in international law. Footnote 28 The dataset was supplemented by publicly available information about the president who signed an agreement, footnote 75 Senate Compositions by Party and “Legislative Power Scores for Policy Change” (LPPC) for the Senate, as Martin did. Footnote 76 LPPC scores reflect how difficult it is for a president to enforce the law.
A higher rate of LPPC indicates a decrease in the political costs of implementing the legislation in the Senate. The LPPC score is established according to the following formula: Finally, some scientists have argued that a major difference between contracts and agreements between Congress and the executive branch lies in the information generated in the process of obtaining legislative authorization. Fn. 58 In other words, in the context of concluding an agreement as a treaty, the executive must disclose important private information in order to be convincing and obtain the approval of a qualified majority in the Senate. This dynamic can be illustrated by using the most important example of John Yoo, who envisions a potential military conflict between the US and China over a territory and negotiations over how that area would be divided. The domestic political struggle for treaty approval requires negotiators to truthfully communicate to the Senate the chances of victory against China. Yoo argues that observing this process would allow China to obtain more accurate information about the U.S. beliefs than the Congress-Executive Agreement provides.
China can therefore insist that the agreement be concluded in the form of a treaty and, given that the underlying information is more accurate, it can be encouraged to build confidence in further compliance with the agreement. 97 Cf. Panayiota, Alexandropoulos, Enforceability of Executive Congressional Agreements in Instead of an Article II Treaty for the Purposes of Extradition: Elizaphan Ntakirutimana v Janet Reno, 45 vill. L. Rev. 107, 113-14 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court clearly established the legality of extradition under an executive agreement in the Valentine case); See also Klarevas, Louis, The Surrender of Alleged War Criminals to International Tribunals: Examination of the Constitution of Extradition via Congressional Executive Agreement, 8 UCLA J. Int`l. & For. He is a monkey. 77, 107 (2003) (provide other cases to support Valentine`s interpretation of extradition on the basis of an executive agreement).
1. « Jay’s-contrat » par Early America (Domaine public) via Commons Wikimedia2. « Contrat de Paris 1783 – dernière page (hi-res) » Par ourdocuments.gov (Domaine public) via Commons Wikimedia3. « Churchill, Staline, and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference (103/117) » (Domaine Public) via GoodFreePhotos4. . . . .